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Abstract 
Prior studies of bank loan announcements depict significant capital market reactions. More 
recent evidence however, fails to identify such reactions (Fields et al. 2006, Maskara & 
Mullineaux 2011). In this study, we consider market reactions to loan initiations where the 
borrower has no prior record of bank lending. Zero-leverage firms are firms that have zero 
outstanding short-term or long-term debt in their capital structure (Strebulaev & Yang 2013). 
Using a unique hand collected sample of bank loan announcements for Australian Mining 
Development Stage entities, we find that both initial bank loans and subsequent bank loans 
attract significant market reactions. Further, we produce evidence consistent with 
announcements of such loans reducing information asymmetry which we proxy for with bid-
ask spreads and trading volume. Our final analysis examines evidence of bank specialisation. 
We find that borrowers from the industry leader in terms of loan origination (Macquarie 
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Financial intermediation theory suggests banks play an important role in information 
production within an economy. Banks have private information suggesting they know more 
about the prospects of the firms they lend to than other external parties. Early empirical 
evidence provides support for the belief that bank loan agreements act to reduce information 
asymmetries, and signal positive news to the market. Studies observing a positive share price 
reaction surrounding bank loan announcements include Mikkelson & Partch 1986, James 
1987 and Lummer & McConnell 1989.
1
 However, recent studies show that market reactions 
to bank loan announcements may not be positive, with doubt placed upon the effectiveness of 
bank loan decisions to signal information to equity investors (Fields et al. 2006; Maskara & 
Mullineaux 2011). One possible reason why studies fail to observe positive market reactions 
might be the distinction between initial and subsequent bank loans. Most empirical studies to 
date consider samples where bank loan announcements are observed for firms with 
established credit or borrowing histories. 
Our study has three main objectives. First, we aim to provide a better understanding 
of signalling around bank loan announcements by observing market reactions surrounding 
zero-leverage firms making initial bank loan announcements. Observing initial loan 
announcements can indicate whether banks have an information advantage over other capital 
market participants at the outset of a loan agreement, or whether an information advantage 
develops from a continuing working relationship with a borrower. Prior studies have 
concluded that banks enter new credit agreements with no information advantage relative to 
                                                 
1
 The ability to minimise information asymmetry problems suggests that banks are unique compared to other 
sources of external finance (Fama 1985). This is shown empirically as all other forms of security issuances and 
financing decisions are associated with negative or neutral share price response, examples include seasoned 
equity offerings (Mikkelson & Partch 1986), initial public offerings (Loughran & Ritter 1995), share purchase 




other investors. However, as banks maintain a lending relationship with their customers, they 
produce superior information which gives them a relative information advantage over 
external parties (Lummer & McConnell 1989). These conclusions are based on samples of 
observed bank switches and bank loan renewals. In contrast, a loan initiation sample provides 
an interesting setting to examine whether bank lending decisions can signal superior private 
information to investors. We argue that observing loan initiations, as opposed to bank 
switches and renewals as in previous studies, is a better setting in which to observe bank 
lending signals.  
Second, we consider whether bank loans resolve information asymmetry by signalling 
private information to the market. We analyse changes in the borrowing firm’s bid-ask spread 
and trading volume surrounding bank loan announcements to proxy for changes in the level 
of information asymmetry. A negative association between bank loans and borrower 
information asymmetry would be consistent with Fama (1985), who argues that many 
organizations pay periodic monitoring fees for lines of credit from banks that remain unused, 
for the sole purpose of providing positive signals about the firm’s incomplete contracts. Other 
literature suggests that the presence of bank debt in firms' capital structures lowers 
information asymmetry in that it attenuates IPO under-pricing (James & Wier 1990; Slovin & 
Young 1990), negative share price response to SEO’s (Slovin et al. 1990) and lowers the cost 
of debt capital for bond issuances (Datta et al. 1999).  
Third, we extend the lender identity literature and investigate whether industry 
specialist lenders provide incremental signalling benefits. Prior literature has found that 
higher quality lenders are associated with larger share price reactions upon the announcement 
of bank loans (Lee & Sharpe 2009; Ross 2010). Theory indicates that banking industry 
specialisation should exist with Almazan (2002) suggesting that banks tend to concentrate 
their portfolios by either region or industry, and that increasing bank expertise in an area can 
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lead to decreased information production and monitoring costs. We test whether a subset of 
industry specialists lenders signal more information to the market around loan 
announcements compared to non-specialists. 
In this study, we examine market reactions to bank loan announcements in a new 
setting, Australia and in an industry typified by high information asymmetry (the mining 
industry). Bank loans are theorised to benefit a firm characterised by having no other 
monitors (Diamond 1984), a poor information environment (Dhaliwal et al. 2011), high 
information asymmetry (Boyd & Prescott 1986), low analyst coverage (Best & Zhang 1993), 
low auditor impact, high risk (Diamond 1991), and small firm size (Fama 1985). These 
characteristics broadly describe mining firms (Ferguson et al. 2011a; Ferguson et al. 2011b). 
Additionally, the majority of mining firms follow a predictable lifecycle and will list on the 
ASX with zero leverage. This makes mining firms an ideal sample setting to consider the 
effects of bank financing, as bank loan initiation is both observable and likely to resolve a 
substantial information asymmetry. If bank loan announcements contain no significant 
information in a setting where theory predicts reactions will be strong, then it provides 
support for recent claims that bank loans contain no relevant information (Fields et al. 2006). 
We find that both initial and subsequent loan announcements generate significant 
market reactions in this setting consistent with expectations. Multivariate tests indicate no 
distinction between loan initiations and subsequent loans, suggesting the banks prior 
relationship with the borrowing firm is insignificant in explaining announcement returns. 
Rather, announcement returns are driven by loan characteristics including size of the loan and 
the sequencing of loan announcements. Further, we find that bank loan announcements are 
associated with a reduction in firm information asymmetry. Average abnormal trading 
turnover is significantly positive on the bank loan announcement day, and cumulative 
average abnormal turnover is significantly positive in the two trading weeks after loan 
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announcement. Cumulative average abnormal spread is significantly negative in the two 
trading weeks following a bank loan announcement. Increased trading volume and decreased 
bid-ask spread is consistent with a reduction in the borrowing firm’s information asymmetry. 
Last, the industry leader in mine financing in Australia (Macquarie Bank) is 
associated with larger cumulative average abnormal returns. These results are present in both 
univariate level and multivariate analysis after controlling for firm and loan characteristics. 
This result provides support for the hypothesis that industry specialist lenders provide more 
informative signals about the borrowing firm’s creditworthiness and future prospects. The 
remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The second section details prior literature and 
research hypothesis. The third section outlines the research design. The fourth section 
contains empirical results, while the fifth section concludes.  
2. Background and hypothesis development 
There are numerous reasons to expect a positive share price reaction to an 
announcement of an initial loan. First, theory suggests that banks are better able to screen 
potential loans relative to outside lenders due to their access to a borrowing firm’s private 
information (Leland & Pyle 1977). Capital market participants will act on signals provided by 
information intermediaries only when an intermediary has a sufficient stake in the market to 
remove incentives to misrepresent their information (Campbell & Kracaw 1980). Bank loans 
are a credible signal in this sense since they back their opinions by either allocating or 
declining resources to borrowers (Fama 1985). Based on the informational advantages banks 
possess over external parties, and the credibility their lending decisions can signal, investors 
will gain insight into the quality of a firm’s incomplete contracts after loan approval. We 
argue that initial loan announcements may be associated with more positive share price 
reaction, since this is the first signal of bank lending credibility sent to the market.  
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Second, banks provide ex-post monitoring which can raise the probability of firm 
success through enforcement of efficient project choice, or the owner’s effort (Diamond 
1991; Faulkender & Petersen 2006; Mester et al. 2007). Additionally the bank may take a 
position on the board of directors (Fama 1985).
2
 Further, banks are more efficient at 
restructuring firms in financial distress relative to outside lenders (Bolton & Scharfstein 
1996; Bolton & Freixas 2000). Thus, ex-post monitoring provided by a bank after an initial 
loan may have a more substantive effect on the borrower’s operations than subsequent loans, 
thus having a greater effect on a borrowing firm’s value. 
Finally Ross (1977) argues that management is likely to have inside information about 
the firm value, with firms that are truly high quality having incentives to engage in signalling. 
Ross (1977) suggests that one such signal may be the firms' use of debt financing. As 
managers incur a penalty if their firm goes bankrupt, high quality firms will have a higher 
tolerance for debt than lower quality firms. The implication is that the market should interpret 
higher debt as a signal of higher value. A special case is of course loan initiation, where a 
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 An example of a lender requiring a position on the board of directors is shown when Matrix Metals Limited 
announced the required to appoint a representative to the board of directors as a condition of their $10 million 
loan. 
3
 Prior studies examine the information content of ‘new’ loans and loan renewals, but not loan initiations. For 
example, Lummer and McConnell (1989) classify a new loan as a firm that arranges a loan with a new bank that 
they have no previous loan from, stating; 
“Except for five cases, all of the firms in our sample that announce new credit agreements had some prior bank 
financing in place, albeit with a different bank”.  
This approach was adopted in following studies such as in Slovin et al. (1992) who state; 
“New credit agreements with new banks are classified as initiations, even if other bank debt may exist.” 
4
 We note the distinction between a ‘new’ loan as described in the literature to date and a ‘loan initiation’ as we 
define it may influence results and conclusions of prior papers. Theory predicts bank loan announcements will 
signal value to outsiders when there are few other intermediaries and information asymmetry is high (Diamond 
1984; Boyd & Prescott 1986). In prior samples, the borrower already had existing bank debt. When a new bank 
loan is announced with another bank, the new bank duplicates the initial banks screening and monitoring, with 
little extra information signalled to the market. The result that banks possess no informational advantage at the 
beginning of a loan (Lummer & McConnell 1989; Slovin et al. 1992; Best & Zhang 1993), may be due to 
sample announcements that miss the loan initiation which is when a firm is first screened and bank monitoring 
begins. In other words, going from an environment of zero bank-monitoring to having bank monitoring is likely 
to have a substantially different effect on market perceptions of the firm than an existing borrower obtaining a 
new loan from a second new bank (simply an additional loan for an already existing borrower). 
7 
 
In summary, we hypothesise that the announcement of a firm obtaining its first bank 
loan and changing from a zero-leverage capital structure to having private debt, is associated 
with a positive share price reaction. We pose H1 as follows: 
H1: Initial loan announcements are associated with a positive share price reaction. 
Theories of financial intermediation explain the role of banks in reducing information 
asymmetry. Leland and Pyle (1977) suggest that information asymmetry may be the primary 
reason that intermediaries exist. Campbell and Kracaw (1980) demonstrate that an important 
function of financial intermediation is the production of information. These theories argue 
that banks provide unique information production services (Best & Zhang 1993). They 
suggest banks know more about the prospects of the firms they lend to than others. Thus, a 
bank’s lending decision can signal private information to the market and lower the 
information asymmetry of the borrower. 
Bank loans being associated with a reduction in a borrowers information asymmetry 
is consistent with Fama (1985) in that many organizations pay periodic monitoring fees for 
lines of credit from banks even though they do not access the finance. The sole purpose of 
maintaining the loans is to provide positive signals about the firm’s incomplete contracts. The 
presence of bank debt in firms' capital structures is seen to lower information by mitigating 
IPO under-pricing (James & Wier 1990; Slovin & Young 1990), negative share price 
response to SEO’s (Slovin et al. 1990) and lowers the cost of debt capital for bond issuances 
(Datta et al. 1999). Thus, there is evidence that banks help lower information asymmetry and 
mitigate adverse selection and moral hazard problems intrinsic to external financing. 
However, despite theory predicting banks monitoring will reduce borrower 
information asymmetry, no study has directly tested whether bank loan announcements are 




associated with such a reduction. If banks mitigate information asymmetry, we expect a 
reduction in the borrowers bid-ask spread and an increase in trading volume after a bank loan 
announcement. We test this assertion in the following manner; 
H2: Loan announcements are associated with a reduction in firm information asymmetry. 
Prior research indicates that lender identity is associated with bank loan 
announcement returns. Borrowers experience a larger positive abnormal return surrounding 
bank loan announcements issued by higher quality banks (Billett et al. 1995; Johnson 1997; 
Lee & Sharpe 2009; Ross 2010). Ross (2010) defines the three largest banks by market share 
in the syndicated lending market as high quality, and reports a positive association between 
loans arranged by the high quality banks and abnormal price reactions around loan 
announcements. Bushman and Wittenberg-Moerman (2012) find that loans from higher 
reputation lenders, classified as the six largest banks active in the syndicated loan market are 
associated with higher firm profitability and credit quality in the subsequent three years to the 
loan. Lenders may have different monitoring abilities, which enhance a borrower's value by 
assuring that appropriate investment and spending decisions are implemented (Fama 1985). If 
negotiating and managing high-risk loans (with many covenants to be designed and enforced) 
requires different skills than low-risk credits, individual lenders may choose to specialize 
(Billett et al. 1995). We extend this literature by testing whether a mining specialist lender 
signals more information about the borrower to outside investors. 
Industry specialisation and leadership has been shown to exist amongst financial 
intermediaries such as underwriters (Carter & Manaster 1990; Booth & Chua 1996), auditors 
(Craswell et al. 1995; Ferguson & Stokes 2002; Ferguson et al. 2003) and non-financial 
assurers (Ferguson & Pundrich 2013). Almazan (2002) reports that banks tend to concentrate 
their portfolios by either region or industry, and that increasing bank specialisation can lead 
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to decreased information production and monitoring costs due to learning.Winton (1999) 
shows that banks benefit from specialisation due to more effective monitoring of borrowers, 
leading to decreased adverse selection costs. Empirical support for these claims is provided 
by Acharya et al. (2006) who show that specialist banks have higher returns and lower risk 
than diversified banks, due to improved information production and monitoring capabilities. 
The existence of bank industry specialisation is expected to occur in settings with 
high information asymmetry (Bonaccorsi di Patti & Dell'Ariccia 2004). High information 
asymmetry leads to banks carving out a captive market by overinvesting in information 
acquisition, enhancing lending efficiency and leading to excessive information production 
(Hauswald & Marquez 2006). Thus, the Australian MDSE setting is ideal to test for the 
effects of banking industry specialisation due to the high level of information asymmetry and 
specialist geological knowledge required to understand a mining project. Anecdotal evidence 
supports the existence of banking industry specialisation within the mining industry in 
Australia.
5
 We predict that specialist lenders will signal more private information to outside 
investors leading to higher bank loan announcement returns. This hypothesis can be formally 
stated as: 
                                                 
5
 A resource analyst from Emerging Trends (2010) commenting on a mining firms chance of obtaining 
bank financing states;  
“Between the failure of Opes Prime, the withdrawal of Societe Generale and the scaled back 
operations of ABN Amro, a lingering after effect of the global financial crisis is that mining finance in Australia 
is largely in the hands of Macquarie Bank, which now has a near monopoly on project finance.”  
Borrowers are also cognisant of the of the market leading position of Macquarie Bank as this quote from 
Saracen Resources shows; 
 “We are pleased to advise the market about the facilities from Macquarie, which is a leader in this 
segment of the resources sector. The Finance Facilities bring substantial benefits to Saracen… This is a solid 
outcome for our shareholders, and gives us significant financial flexibility.” 
Additionally, Macquarie Bank market themselves as an industry leader in resource financing. Macquarie Bank 
state they are the “global leader in financing the resources infrastructure sector.” Further quotes from the 
Macquarie Bank website refer to their specialisation within the industry; 
“Macquarie Capital's Resources team combines financial services and specialised industry knowledge 
with a focus on companies operating globally in the resources sector, particularly the mining and metals, 
energy and related services sectors… This specialisation provides miners with the ability to efficiently finance 
new or existing capital intensive infrastructure to focus on their core businesses.” 
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H3: Firms that receive loans from an industry specialist will have higher abnormal 
bank loan announcement returns relative to loans received from non-industry-specialists. 
3. Research Design 
3.1 Sample & data 
This study draws on a sample of listed Australian MDSEs. The sample period used for this 
study spans September 1998 to July 2013.
6
 Text searches of ASX announcements serve as 
the primary source of bank loan announcement identification. The characteristics of each 
announced loan are hand collected from the bank loan announcement documents. Capital 
market data such as daily price, bid, ask, volume and market capitalisation is obtained from 
Datasteam. Firm level financial data is obtained from Aspect Huntley. Analyst information is 
extracted from the Institutional Brokers' Estimate System (I/B/E/S). 
Table  displays the sample size of both initial and subsequent loan announcements. 
An initial loan is defined as a loan issued by a zero-leverage firm initiating its first debt 
position. A subsequent loan is defined as a loan issued to a firm who has a positive debt level 
prior to the loan announcement. A total of 216 initial loan announcements and 191 
subsequent loan announcements are identified in the period 1998 to 2013.
7
 These 
announcements are made by 126 and 96 unique companies respectively.
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3.2 Loan announcement returns 
Abnormal returns are calculated as: 
         [
    
      
]    [
    
      
]      (1) 
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 The ASX announcements search tool available in DatAnalysis Premium allows for text searches of 
announcements archived after September 1998. Thus all readily available data is used to create the sample. 
7
 Announcement frequency is increasing in time. This is expected, since there are an increasing numbers of 
firms listed in the mining industry in the second half of the sample period due to the mining boom. The 
frequency of announcements is relatively stable in the period from 2006 to 2012; probably due to lag effects 
from the boom continuing into the GFC period (mining projects are notoriously long in terms of duration). 
8
 The number of unique companies making initial loan announcements is less than the total number of 
announcements. Firms may make multiple announcements regarding a single bank loan to the market. 
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where;       is the abnormal return of firm i at time t, with time t being the event date 
of a bank loan announcement,      is the share price of firm i at time t and      is the index 
value of the All Ordinaries at time t.
9
 The cumulative abnormal return from event day q to 
event day s is the summation of the abnormal returns, calculated as: 
      (   )  ∑      
 
           (2) 
3.3 Model specification 
In order to provide additional insight into the cross-sectional variation of the abnormal 
returns surrounding bank loan announcements, an OLS regression model is used. This model 
is specified as follows;  
      (   )                                                
                                                   
                         (3) 
 where; the dependent variable,        (   ) = the cumulative abnormal return for firm 
i at time t over the window q to s, calculated as per (2). Initial represents a binary variable 
capturing whether the loan is an initial loan. An initial loan is defined as the first loan a firm 
obtains as it changes its capital structure from a zero-leverage firm to a positive leverage 
firm. FirstAnn is a binary variable equal to one if the announcement is the first announcement 
regarding a particular loan. FirstAnn is predicted to be positively associated with abnormal 
returns, as the first announcement made to the market regarding a loan should contain the 
most new, and price sensitive information. LnAmount is calculated as the dollar amount of 
borrowed funds scaled by the borrowing firm’s total assets in the period prior to the loan 
announcement. A positive association is expected between the amount of funds borrowed and 
                                                 
9
 All prices are adjusted for changes in the basis of quotation, such as dividends on the ex-dividend day. 
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the abnormal market reaction. A larger loan represents a stronger vote in confidence of the 
firm’s creditworthiness by the bank, and signals positive news about the firm. 
Lenders is the number of lenders mentioned in the bank loan announcement. A 
negative association is expected between the number of lenders and abnormal returns. As the 
number of lenders increases, the ability of banks to renegotiate debt when a firm is distressed 
decreases (Preece & Mullineaux 1996). Hedge is a binary variable equal to 1 if it is disclosed 
within the bank loan announcement that commodity or foreign exchange hedging is required 
before a loan agreement can be completed. Hedging might have a positive or negative sign. 
On the positive side, hedging improves certainty regarding future firm cash flows and lowers 
firm risk, especially where the project has a high cost of production. However equity 
investors may potentially lose any upside or option value from commodity price fluctuations 
and consider it a burden on future profitability in times of rising commodity prices. 
BankEquity is a binary variable equal to 1 if it is disclosed within the bank loan 
announcement that the bank owns shares, warrants or options in the borrowing firm. A 
positive association is predicted between banks holding equity in the firm and providing a 
loan. If a bank holds an equity position, it is a signal that they believe the firm has potential 
upside. EquityRaise is a binary variable equal to 1 if it is disclosed within the bank loan 
announcement that the bank requires the borrowing firm to raise further equity before a loan 
agreement can be completed. If a bank loan is dependent on the firm issuing more equity, a 
negative coefficient is expected as equity raisings are associated with negative share price 
reactions (Mikkelson & Partch 1986). 
LnMCAP measures firm size and is calculated as the natural logarithm of the firm’s 
market capitalisation 5 days before the bank loan announcement. Firm size is expected to 
have a negative relation with abnormal returns. Smaller firms are expected to have higher 
levels of information asymmetry and benefit more from bank finance signals (Fama 1985; 
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Diamond 1989; Slovin et al. 1992). Loss is a binary variable equal to 1 if the firm reported a 
net profit after tax of less than zero in the annual report prior to the bank loan announcement. 
Loss is expected to have a positive association with announcement returns. Firms issued a 
loan while making losses are likely to have a larger gain in creditworthiness if a bank signals 
the firm is able to pay back future loaned funds. Finally, NumAnalyst is the number of 
analysts following firm i on the announcement date of a loan. A negative associated between 
the number of analysts following a firm and its abnormal returns surrounding a bank loan 
announcement is predicted. An increasing number of analysts covering a firm represent an 
improved information environment and reduction in information asymmetry. Bank loans are 
predicted to signal more information when information asymmetry is high. 
3.4 Information asymmetry  
Two proxies are used to measure changes in information asymmetry. First, the bid-ask 
spread addresses the adverse selection problem that arises from transacting in firm shares in 
the presence of asymmetrically informed investors. Less information asymmetry implies less 
adverse selection, which, in turn, implies a smaller bid-ask spread (Leuz & Verrecchia 2000). 
Second, trading volume is a measure of liquidity that captures the willingness of some 
investors who hold firm shares to sell and the willingness of others to buy. This willingness 
to transact in firm shares should be inversely related to the existence of information 
asymmetries (Leuz & Verrecchia 2000). When investors’ beliefs converge about the value of 
the firm, there is an increase in trading turnover in the firm’s stock (Diamond & Verrecchia 
1991). Consistent with this proposition, Easley et al. (1996) present evidence that suggests 
high turnover stocks have lower information based trading. Turnover is therefore used as a 
measure of a firm’s level of information asymmetry with increases in turnover associated 





We examine Hypothesis 2 by testing for changes in the borrowing firm’s information 
asymmetry in the period surrounding a bank loan announcement. The abnormal change in the 
bid-ask spread is measured as: 
          [
(                       )
 
 ⁄ (                       )
]     (4) 
          (   )  
∑          
 
   
(   )
       (5) 
                               (   )     (6) 
          is the daily average bid-ask spread for firm i on day t calculated as the 
closing             for the stock of firm i during day t less the closing             for the 
stock of firm i divided by the closing mid-point price.            is the average daily bid-
ask spread for the stock of firm i over days q to s.            is the abnormal bid-ask 
spread, calculated as the difference between           and the           . In the main 
results, p and q are t-100 and t-15, respectively. To examine if changes in abnormal bid-ask 
spread are significantly different from zero, student t-tests are calculated. 
The cumulative average abnormal spread from event day q to event day s is the 
summation of the abnormal spread, calculated as: 
       (   )  ∑           
 
         (7) 
Trading Volume 
The event study methodology is adopted to analyse whether a firm’s abnormal trading 
turnover is significantly different from zero following a bank loan announcement. Abnormal 
turnover is calculated as: 
        
      
          
         (8) 
        (   )  
∑       (   )⁄
 
   
          
       (9) 
15 
 
                         (   )      (10) 
        is the turnover of the stock of firm i on day t, calculated as the volume of 
shares traded for firm i on day t (      ), divided by the number of ordinary shares 
outstanding for firm i on day t (          ).          is the average daily turnover for the 
stock of firm i at time t over days p to q.          is the abnormal turnover of firm i at time 
t, calculated as the difference between         and         . In the main results, p and q 
are t-90 and t-16, respectively. To examine if changes in abnormal turnover are significantly 
different from zero, student t-tests are calculated. The cumulative average abnormal turnover 
from event day q to event day s is the summation of the abnormal turnover, calculated as: 
       (   )  ∑         
 
         (11) 
3.5 Lender industry specialisation 
We examine Hypothesis 3 at the univariate level comparing event study results of loans 
issued by banks considered industry specialists with a sample of loans issued by banks 
considered non-industry specialists. Statistical differences between the two samples are 
compared using student t-tests. Next, OLS regression is used to examine the multivariate 
determinants of the abnormal return experienced surrounding bank loan announcements. To 
determine if industry specialist banks signal more information to equity investors relative to 
non-specialist banks, the model specification described in Equation (3) is altered to include 
the variable Macquarie as follows; 
      (   )                                                   
                                                              
                         (12) 
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where: All variables are defined as previously outlined in equation (3) except for the new test 
variable Macquarie. Macquarie is a dummy variable coded ‘1’ if a bank loan has been issued 
by Macquarie Bank, the bank classified as a mining industry specialist, and ‘0’ otherwise. 
4. Results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 2, with Panel A reporting descriptives for 
firms announcing initial loans and Panel B reporting descriptives for firms announcing 
subsequent loans. Firms announcing an initial loan are significantly smaller than firms 
announcing subsequent loans, with the median market capitalisation (MCAP) of a firm 
announcing an initial loan is approximately $80 million, ($195 million for firms announcing 
subsequent loans). Median total assets (Total Assets) for the initial loan sample are $30 
million ($115 million for firms announcing subsequent loans). Median total book value of 
equity (Total Equity) is $27 million for the initial loan sample ($79 million for the subsequent 
loan sample). All three size measures show firms announcing initial loans to be smaller than 
firms announcing subsequent loans.  
The level of debt between the two samples, not surprisingly, is vastly different. Bank 
loans are classified as initial loans if the borrowing firm is a zero-leverage firm. Thus the 
short-term and long-term debt of the loan initiation sample is zero. Firms obtaining 
subsequent loans have prior debt (median borrowings of over $5 million).
10
 Both samples 
report a median net profit (Net Profit After Tax) of approximately negative $2 million. This 
suggests that the majority of borrowing firms in both samples are loss making firms. 
                                                 
10
 There are two reasons why the minimum debt position of the subsequent loan sample is reported as zero. 
First, a firm may have zero long-term debt, while still have positive short-term debt and vice versa. Second, as 
debt levels are taken from the annual report prior to the loan announcement, there are constituents in the sample 
who have obtained an initial loan and subsequent loan in the same financial year. Thus observing the debt 
position from the prior financial report would result in an observation of zero debt, as the initial loan was 
entered into during the reporting period and is not yet disclosed in the financial statements. 
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Descriptive statistics on the loss indicator, Loss, shows that 84.36% of firms in the initial loan 
sample are loss making firms (65.61% in the subsequent loan sample). 
Firms announcing an initial loans and are shown to be younger in age, average firm 
age is 1,868 days (4,749 for subsequent loans), and have higher information asymmetry with 
a median spread (AvgSpread) that is 3.01% (2.40% for firms announcing subsequent loans) 
larger and median turnover (AvgTurnover) 0.20% (0.20% for firms announcing subsequent 
loans). Initial loan announcing firms have fewer information intermediaries with an average 
of 1.62 fewer analysts (NumAnalyst) following the firm. Additionally fewer initial loan firms 
have any analyst coverage (Analyst)or Big 4 auditors (Big4) with coverage of 39.53% and 
59.07% respectively (55.03% and 68.78% for firms announcing subsequent loans) Overall 
these descriptive statistics show that firms announcing initial loans have an information 
environment that is characterised by high information asymmetry. 
Overall the descriptive statistics describe a sample with characteristics that support 
the notion that the signalling benefits provided by an outside lender should matter. Sample 
firms are small as measured by market capitalisation, total assets and total equity and 
relatively risky as evidenced by their poor profitability records. Information asymmetry is 
relatively high due to low analyst coverage, and the presence of many non-Big 4 auditors.  
4.2 Borrower descriptive statistics 
Loan descriptive statistics are reported in Table 3Table . The size of the average loan 
issued to an initial borrower (Amount), is $76 million ($159 million for subsequent loans, 
more than double the amount borrowed by zero-leverage MDSEs). Consistent with the loan 
initiation sample consisting of smaller firms, the amount borrowed is under half the average 
for subsequent borrowers. The median loan of $31 million suggests a zero-leverage firm will 
have a debt to equity ratio of approximately 50% after securing a loan. A significant variation 
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in loan size is present within both samples. Minimum loan amounts of $1 million represent 
relatively small loans, even for the firms with the smallest market capitalisation, however at 
the upper end of the spectrum, multi-billion dollar loans are observed to fund large projects. 
The median and average loan term (Maturity) in both samples is between 3 to 4 years 
representing loans of a medium term nature. The majority of loans in both samples are issued 
by a single lender (Number of lenders).
11
 
A common way banks monitor firms is through the use of loan covenants and within 
this sample there are two common covenants. Over 25% of loan initiations (18% of 
subsequent loans) require commodity or foreign exchange hedging (Hedging) to be 
implemented by the lender. The requirement to hedge production or currency risk alters the 
project pay-off and is an example of bank monitoring potentially lowering firm risk. 
Additionally, over 10% of loans were conditional upon the borrowing firm raising further 
equity (EquityRaising) before drawdown to ensure the borrowing firm maintained a suitable 
debt to equity ratio.  
Finally, the variable BankEquity indicates that 28% of initial loans and 22% of 
subsequent loans were issued to borrowers where the lender had either stock, warrant or 
option positions. Banks having an equity or option position in the borrower can be interpreted 
as an endorsement of the firm’s future prospects as banks look to access the firm’s future 
upside. 
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 The terms of the loan disclosed in announcements varies significantly. Over 95% of firms disclose 
the number lenders (Number of lenders) and the amount (Amount) of the loan. However disclosure of other 
material items is less pervasive, with only 46% of initial loans and 57% of subsequent loans disclosing the 
maturity of the loan (Maturity). Less than 25% of firms disclosed the interest rate (Interest rate) of the loan at 
the time of announcement with many firms stating lack of disclosure to be due to commercial confidence. Of the 
firms which disclosed the interest rate, the majority of loans are based on variable interest rates with a fixed 




4.3 Lender descriptive statistics 
Within the sample of loan announcements 121 unique lenders are identified, with 635 
lender observations across the total sample.
12
 Table 4 presents the top 40 lenders sorted by 
the number of loans issued. The most striking feature of Table 4 is the dominance of 
Macquarie Bank, who wrote 70 mining project bank loans, a clear market leader in terms of 
loan frequency. Macquarie Bank wrote more than double the number of loans compared to 
ANZ Bank (33). Macquarie Bank’s industry leadership depicted in Table 4 is consistent with 
anecdotal evidence documented in footnote 5. .Table 4 displays the total value of loans 
issued, with Macquarie Bank ranked in 3
rd
 with over $3 billion in loans issued.
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4.4 Loan announcement return 
Table 5, Panel A reports abnormal returns during the -5 to 5 day window for the full 
sample of bank loan announcements. A significantly positive abnormal return of 2.051% is 
observed on the announcement date (T0), consistent with prior studies (James 1987; Lummer 
& McConnell 1989; Best & Zhang 1993). Panel B reports results for initial loan 
announcements. Results are supportive of Hypothesis 1, with initial bank loan 
announcements being associated with a significantly positive abnormal return of 2.480% on 
the announcement date. This result contrasts prior studies that find ‘new’ loans do not attract 
a significant market response (Lummer & McConnell 1989; Best & Zhang 1993). Table 5, 
Panel C reports a significantly positive abnormal return of 1.551% on the event date for 
subsequent loan announcements.  
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 The number of lender observations is larger than the total sample size due to loan syndication in which more 
than one lender is identified in a single announcement. 
13
 China Development Bank is the 2
nd
 largest lender in the industry in terms of loan size with outstanding loans 
of $3,468,000,000. This figure is driven by three large loans valued close to a billion dollars each. Additionally 
the strong performance in total loaned funds by Credit Suisse and ANZ is due to having single loans worth over 
$1 billion each. 
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We consider whether the abnormal return surrounding bank loan announcements 
persists over a longer event window, with the cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) 
calculated in (2) over the -5 to 5 event day window. Table 6 Panel A displays the CAAR for 
the total sample of bank loan announcements over various windows. The significantly 
positive -5 to 5 day CAAR of 2.518% is driven by the market response in the 0,1 event 
window. The -5 to -2 day CAAR is small and insignificant, suggesting no information 
leakage prior to loan announcements. Similarly, the 2 to 5 day CAAR is also small and 
insignificant. Table , Panel B presents CAARs for the sample of initial loan announcements. 
Results further support Hypothesis 1, with the -5 to 5 day CAAR a significantly positive 
2.732%. The abnormal return observed in the -1 to 1 day window is maintained during the 
following trading week, with little evidence of significant returns in the pre event window. 
Table 6 Panel C provides evidence that the subsequent loan announcements behave in a 
manner similar to the initial loan sample, with a significantly positive CAAR of 2.268% 
observed over the -5 to 5 day event window, and little evidence of either significant pre or 
post announcement returns or mean reversion.
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Univariate results testing Hypothesis 1 are provided in Table 5 and Table 6, with 
results strongly supporting hypothesis 1, with initial bank loan announcements are associated 
with a positive share price response. The positive share price response is observed on both the 
event day AAR, and over a -5 to 5 day CAAR. This result shows that bank lending decisions 
do provide unambiguous signals to equity market participants. This result contrasts with prior 
research that finds banks do not signal information to equity markets upon the announcement 
of a ‘new’ loan (Lummer & McConnell 1989; Slovin et al. 1992; Best & Zhang 1993) which 
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 In unreported test the initial loan sample AAR is 0.93% larger and significantly different from the subsequent 
loan sample at a 5% level of significance on event day zero. The difference in CAAR -5 to 5 day event window 
shows the initial loan sample to have a larger abnormal return than the subsequent loan sample; however results 




is often just a switch in lenders. Subsequent loan announcements have a positive market 
reaction, albeit lower in magnitude than initial loan announcements.  
4.3 Market reaction determinants 
We regress bank loan and firm characteristics on the cumulative abnormal return 
surrounding the 0 to 1, -5 to 5 and -10 to 10 day event windows.
15
 Table 7 presents our cross-
sectional returns prediction with three models presented where the dependent variable 
cumulative average abnormal return is defined over the 0 to 1 (Panel A), -5 to 5 (Panel B) 
and -10 to 10 (Panel C) day windows. All three models are significant at the p<0.01% level 
with F-statistics greater than 2.5. Results in Panel A shows the coefficients (with the 
exception of LnMCap) have the predicted signs. Significant predictors of abnormal return 
include whether the announcement is the first in the sequence of announcements (FirstAnn), 
the amount borrowed (LnAmount), and whether the bank has an equity position in the 
borrowing firm (BankEquity). LnAmount provides the strongest predictor of abnormal returns 
with a positive coefficient of 0.18, significant at p<0.000. This indicates that relatively larger 
loans are associated with higher abnormal returns. FirstAnn has a positive coefficient of 0.28, 
significant at p<0.001. A firm’s first announcement regarding its bank loan contains the most 
new information, and the price response is most positive for these announcements. If a bank 
has an equity position in the borrowing firm (BankEquity), it is associated with a more 
positive price reaction, with a coefficient of 0.016, although is only marginally significant at 
conventional levels (p= 0.10). This is consistent with the argument that banks are attracted to 
the potential future project upside. Additionally the variable Hedge has a negative coefficient 
of -0.015, p-value of 0.115. Although only marginally significant, this suggests hedging 
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 In unreported tests a correlation matrix shows that multi-collinearity does not appear to be a concern. 
Significant correlations are under 0.4 for all variables except for LnMCap which is correlated with NumAnalyst 
and LnAmount. Furthermore, in unreported tests all variance inflations factors on primary multivariate models 
reported in Table  are below 1.5. 
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lowers future project upside by eliminating option value associated with a rise in commodity 
prices. 
Table 7, Panel B presents results over the event window -5 to 5. The explanatory 
power of the model decreases, with the adjusted R squared of 0.056 lower than presented in 
Panel A. Once again, FirstAnn and LnAmount remain significant predictors of announcement 
returns with coefficients of 0.026 and 0.18. EquityRaise and NumAnalyst are also significant. 
EquityRaise has a positive coefficient of 0.061, significant at p<0.05. A loan announcement 
that mentions further equity issuance is required as a condition precedent is associated with a 
more positive reaction. Slovin et al. (1990) find that firms with bank debt have a lower 
negative price reaction to SEO’s. This result suggests that investors are encouraged by the 
signal of the banks monitoring, with the condition of a further equity issue perhaps signalling 
more project good news. Consistent with predictions that the firm information environment is 
an important determinant of loan announcement returns, NumAnalyst has a negative 
coefficient of -0.005 with a significance level p<0.043. Firms with more analysts have lower 
information asymmetry, with bank loan signals less important where other financial 
intermediaries are present. Table 7, Panel C depicts results over the -10 to 10 day event 
window. The model obtains an adjusted R squared of 0.040. FirstAnn maintains a positive 
coefficient of 0.045 and significance at p<0.040. BankEquity, EquityRaise and NumAnalyst 
are all significant predictors with significance levels similar to those reported in Panel B. 
In summary, results suggest that the amount borrowed (LnAmount), whether the bank 
also has an equity position in the borrowing firm (BankEquity), whether an equity issuance is 
required (EquityRaise) and the number of analysts following the borrowing firm 
(NumAnalyst) are significant at predicting announcement returns. Whether an announcement 
is the first mention of a bank loan announcement is also highly significant (FirstAnn). We 
make the observation that recent studies suggesting bank loans have no impact on the capital 
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market may not have be accounted for information leakage through sequential information 
release (Maskara & Mullineaux 2011). The results for FirstAnn suggests the market reacts 
well before an official loan sign off.  
Contrary to expectations, Initial is not significant in the multivariate context. 
Univariate results suggesting initial loan reactions are stronger than reactions to subsequent 
loan announcements do not hold in the multivariate tests after controlling for firm and loan 
characteristics. Our results suggest banks are able to successfully produce private information 
during the screening process, but the signals provided during subsequent loans are just as 
salient as those provided by initial loans after controlling for firm and loan characteristics. 
4.4 Information asymmetry 
Average abnormal turnover 
Figure 3 presents the average abnormal turnover surrounding bank loan announcements. 
Results across all three samples are displayed in Panels A, B and C, and depict a sharp 
positive spike in AATO on the day of a bank loan announcement. Table 8 presents the 
average abnormal turnover and significance tests surrounding bank loan announcements 
during the -10 to 10 day event window. Bank loan announcements are associated with a 
statistically significant increase in average abnormal turnover on the event date, with a 
0.123% increase in turnover observed on the event date. The initial loan sample is associated 
with a larger increase in abnormal turnover relative to the subsequent loan sample, with 
initial loan announcements experiencing a 0.142% increase in daily abnormal turnover and 
subsequent loans experiencing a 0.102% increase in daily abnormal turnover. A cumulative 
average abnormal turnover over the 0 to 10 day period shows a significantly positive turnover 
of 0.256% in the post announcement window for the total sample, while the -10 to -1 event 
window experiences insignificant changes in abnormal turnover. These results suggest 
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Table 10, Panel A presents results of an OLS regression with cumulative abnormal 
turnover in the -10 to 10 day event window as the dependent variable. The model is 
significant with an F-statistic of 2.8 and significant at p<0.002. An adjusted R squared of 
0.046 is reported. Significant predictors of cumulative average abnormal turnover are 
FirstAnn, BankEquity and EquityRaise. FirstAnn has a coefficient of 0.008 significant at 
p<0.009 and suggests that the increase in a firms turnover is largest when the first loan 
announcement is released. If the bank has an equity position in the borrowing firm 
BankEquity a lower increase in abnormal turnover is observed. EquityRaise is positive with a 
coefficient of 0.013, significant at p<0.005 and. If the firm announces it will be raising more 
equity capital in the future as part of the loan conditions, abnormal turnover increases. After 
controlling for the characteristics of the borrowing firm and loan agreement, Initial is not 
significant. This suggests that both samples of bank loan announcements are associated with 
a reduction in information asymmetry, with both initial and subsequent loans able to signal 
private information about the firm’s future to equity investors. 
Average abnormal spread 
Table 9 presents the average abnormal spread over the -10 to 10 day event window. Panel A, 
B and C display results for the total sample, initial sample and subsequent loan sample 
respectively. A negative abnormal spread is observed on the announcement day and 
following event day in all three samples. Table 9 presents the average abnormal spread and 
tests of statistical significance. Abnormal spreads decrease on the announcement day for all 
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 In unreported tests, the statistical significance of differences between the average abnormal turnover of the 
initial loans sample and the subsequent loans sample is compared. Over both the -1 to 1 and -5 to 5 event 
windows, initial loan announcements experienced a significantly larger average abnormal turnover relative to 
the subsequent loan sample. Results suggest that both initial and subsequent loan announcements are associated 
with an increase in abnormal trading turnover, however consistent with the event study results, reactions are 




three samples, although not at a statistically significant level. Event day 1 experiences a 
reduction in abnormal spread of -0.524% significant at p<0.05, -0.0546% significant at 
p<0.01 and -0.0499% significant at p<0.005 for the total, initial and subsequent sample of 
announcements respectively. The total sample experiences a cumulative average abnormal 
spread that is significantly negative in the 1 to 10 day post announcement period, with 
cumulative spread reducing by -3.165%, significant at p<0.10. This result suggests that bank 
loan announcements result in a decrease in spread that persists over two trading weeks after 
the loan is announced. During the -10 to -1 event pre-event window, cumulative average 
abnormal spread is insignificant across the three samples.
17
 Overall, the decrease in average 
abnormal spread reported in Table 9 is interpreted as showing a decrease in the firm’s level of 
information asymmetry after making a bank loan announcement. These results are consistent 
with other studies showing that firms experience a decrease in bid-ask spread after releasing 
material disclosures to the market (Raman & Tripathy 1993; Boone 1998; Leuz & Verrecchia 
2000; Schauer 2002).  
Table 10, Panel B presents the results of an OLS regression with cumulative average 
abnormal spread over the -10 to 10 day event window as the dependent variable. The model 
obtains an adjusted R squared of 0.042, significant at p<0.006. Variables explaining changes 
to abnormal spread are Lenders, LnMCap, and Loss. Lenders is significantly negative with a 
coefficient of -0.031, p=0.031. A negative coefficient suggests that as the number of lenders 
increases, the spread decreases. LnMCap, is positive with a coefficient of 0.033, significant at 
P<0.011 larger firms have a smaller reduction in information asymmetry after announcing a 
bank loan. Loss is significantly negative with a coefficient of -0.056 significant at p<0.067, 
loss making firms have a larger reduction in information asymmetry after a bank loan 
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 In unreported tests of significance between the abnormal spread of the initial and subsequent loan sample,  no 
significant difference is found across the -3 to 3 day event window between the two samples. This result 
suggests that both the initial and subsequent loan sample of firms benefit from a decrease in bid-ask spread after 




announcement. The results for Loss and LnMCap are consistent with the expectation that 
smaller firms will benefits from the signal of creditworthiness provided by a bank’s loan 
decision. 
In summary, these results provide support for Hypothesis 2 as firms experience an 
increase in average abnormal turnover and a decrease in average abnormal spread on the 
event date of a bank loan announcement. Turnover is higher, and spread is lower in the 10 
day post-announcement period relative to the 10 day pre-announcement period. Thus the 
theories of financial intermediation that suggest banks play an important role in reducing 
information asymmetry are supported by our results. 
4.9 Industry specialisation 
We classify Macquarie Bank as the industry leader with Table 11 displaying the 
cumulative average abnormal return for the sample of loans issued by Macquarie Bank 
compared to the sample of loans issued by non-industry specialist lenders. Larger returns are 
depicted surrounding loans issued by Macquarie Bank in the three event windows considered. 
Over the -5 to 5 day event window, loans to Macquarie Bank experience a cumulative 
average abnormal return of 5.053% compared to the 1.89% return experienced by firms 
borrowing from non-industry specialist lenders. Tests of significance between the two 
samples show this difference in returns is significant at the 5% level. Despite Macquarie 
Bank loans experiencing the predicted larger cumulative average abnormal return over the 
other two event windows, tests are not significant. 
Table 12 presents our augmented OLS regression model including an industry 
leadership variable (Macquarie). Three models are presented with the dependent variable 
being the cumulative average abnormal return in the 0 to 1, -5 to 5 and -10 to 10 day event 
windows in Panels A, B and C respectively. All three models are significant at p<0.01% with 
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F-statistics greater than 3. Panel A presents results for the 0,1 event window. Macquarie is 
insignificant in explaining abnormal returns over the two day event window. This is 
consistent with the univariate results presented in Table 12 which showed significant 
differences in announcement returns only developed over longer event windows. Consistent 
with results presented in Table 7, FirstAnn, LnAmount and BankEquity remain significant 
predictors of loan announcement returns with positive and significant coefficients.  
Panel’s B and C of Table 12 both provide evidence of industry leadership influencing 
loan announcement returns. Panel B shows that during the -5 to 5 day event window 
Macquarie has a positive coefficient of 0.032 and is significant at p<0.10. Panel C shows that 
over the longer event window, Macquarie is the most important predictor of loan 
announcement returns over the -10 to 10 window, with a coefficient of 0.078, significant at 
p<0.05. As in prior analysis, other significant predictors are FirstAnn with a coefficient of 
0.048 and significant at p<0.029 suggesting that the first loan announcement in a sequence of 
announcements is the most informative. EquityRaise with a coefficient of 0.064 significant at 
p<0.071 and NumAnalyst with a coefficient of -0.009 significant at p<0.018 displaying that 
firms with a weaker information environment experience larger loan announcement returns. 
In summary, univariate evidence presented in Table 11, and multivariate evidence 
presented in Table 12 provide support for H3 over longer event windows. Over a short 0 to 1 
day event window, industry leadership is not significantly associated with an increased 
announcement abnormal return. Over a -5 to 5 day event window, Macquarie Bank loans 
have an abnormal return of 5.053%, statistically significant in the test of differences at 
p<0.042. After controlling for borrowing firm characteristics and loan characteristics using 
OLS regression this result remains, and strengthens over the -10 to 10 day event window. 
Consistent with prior studies, bank lender identity is a significant determinant of abnormal 
returns surrounding bank loan announcements (Billett et al. 1995; Ross 2010). Ross (2010) 
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presents evidence that loans from larger banks are associated with higher abnormal returns, 
which our evidence in relation to Macquarie Bank’s specialisation in this setting supports.  
5. Summary and conclusions 
Using a hand collected sample of bank loan announcements disclosed by Australian MDSE’s, 
we provide evidence that bank loan announcements can signal important price sensitive 
information regarding the borrowing firm’s inside information. We consider three research 
questions. First do initial loans matter more than subsequent loans. Second, do loans result in 
reduced information asymmetry and third, does a specialist lender matter. We find Zero-
leverage firms initiating a banking relationship experience a significant and positive 
abnormal return of 2.480% on the day a loan announcement is released, and experience a 
positive cumulative average abnormal return of 2.732% during the -5 to 5 day event window 
surrounding loan announcements. Despite univariate evidence consistent with initial bank 
loans having stronger market reactions, our proxy is not significant in multivariate analysis.  
Rather, firm and loan characteristics such as disclosure sequencing, the amount borrowed, 
equity positions in the borrower and the number of analysts covering the firm are all 
important predictors of announcement returns. In a multivariate setting, both initial and 
subsequent loans are important capital market signals in this setting.  
In terms of our second research question relating to information asymmetry, our 
results show that bank loan announcements are associated with an increase in abnormal 
trading turnover, and a decrease in abnormal bid-ask spread. An increase in turnover and a 
decrease in spread are consistent with a reduction in the borrowing firm’s information 
asymmetry. We suggest that banks signalling their private information regarding the 
borrowing result in an improved information environment in the capital market.  
 Last, consistent with prior research suggesting that bank lender identity is associated 
with bank loan announcement returns (Ross 2010), we investigate whether loans issued by 
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the industry leader Macquarie Bank result in stronger market reactions. Univariate results 
support this assertion, with borrowers obtaining loans from Macquarie Bank experience a 
significantly larger cumulative average abnormal return in the -5 to 5 day event window 
relative to loans issued by non-leaders. Multivariate results support this finding after 
controlling for other firm and loan characteristics.  
In contrast to recent evidence suggesting bank loans are not informative, our results 
suggest bank loans convey strongly positive signals regarding the borrowers future prospects. 
Our study provides further out of US sample evidence on bank loan announcements, and the 
first evidence on the importance of private debt financing in the mining industry. This 
industry is characterised by high information asymmetry, arguably a good setting in which to 
observe important distinctions such as loan initiation and lender specialisation. Given the 
importance of bank financing in the mining industry, our study suggests more can be learnt 
from future industry studies, which have desirable experimental attributes (Shevlin, 1996).  
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Tables and figures 
Table 1 Sample  
  Companies Announcements Period 
Initial loans  126 216 25/02/1998 to 02/04/2013 
     
Subsequent loans  96 191 23/03/1998 to 16/07/2013 
    - 
Total sample  163 407 25/02/1998 to 16/07/2013 
Table  displays the number of observations in the Initial loans and Subsequent loans sample and the period in 
time in which the loan announcement are observed. Companies’ represents the number of unique companies in 





Table 2 Borrower descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Initial loans sample firm descriptive statistics 
Continuous variables Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
MCAP        190,290,424.53          79,270,000.00            249,688,105.04             4,380,000.00           1,113,540,000.00  
Total Assets          68,041,264.43          30,433,001.00              94,500,611.18                   25,244.00               812,924,000.00  
Short Term Debt                                 -                                   -                                       -                                    -                                          -    
Long Term Debt                                 -                                   -                                       -                                    -                                          -    
Total Equity          57,911,514.43          27,564,170.00              79,022,679.98  -       16,828,451.00               642,125,000.00  
Net Profit After Tax -4,869,309.04 -2,068,000.00 29,044,846.81 -285,292,000.00 169,996,000.00 
AvgTurnover 0.26% 0.20% 0.22% 0.00% 1.01% 
AvgSpread 4.11% 3.01% 3.66% 0.71% 23.82% 
Age 1868.78 2600.00 3042.11 0.00 16218.00 
NumAnalyst 0.82 0.00 1.51 0.00 13.00 
 
Binary Variable yes % yes  
Loss 178 84.36%  
Analyst 85 39.53% 




Panel B: Subsequent loans sample descriptive statistics 
Continuous variables Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
MCAP       890,162,928.18       195,050,000.00        2,916,446,307.42             5,200,000.00        32,201,200,000.00  
Total Assets       502,489,017.83       115,157,417.00        1,652,763,281.91             2,866,022.00        19,070,464,767.00  
Long Term Debt       111,605,280.13            4,351,820.00           513,637,813.78                                  -            4,336,296,675.00  
Short Term Debt         19,158,828.21            1,459,955.00              43,340,105.72                                  -                267,139,157.00  
Total Equity       297,755,172.70          79,277,533.00           990,957,329.47  -       24,441,000.00        12,685,021,125.00  
Net Profit After Tax 14,447,878.17 -2,273,139.00 137,895,463.13 -207,521,651.00 956,794,330.00 
AvgTurnover 0.27% 0.20% 0.32% 0.00% 3.31% 
AvgSpread 2.91% 2.40% 2.09% 0.45% 13.09% 
Age 4749.78 3984.00 3567.65 9.00 18018.00 
NumAnalyst 2.44 1.00 4.24 0.00 20.00 
 
Binary Variable yes % yes   
Loss 124 65.61%   
Analyst 104 55.03% 
Big4 130 68.78% 
Table , Panel A provides descriptive statistics for Initial loan observations; Panel B provides descriptive statistics for Subsequent loan observations.  MCAP is the market 
capitalization of firm i as on day t-15 in dollars. Total Asset is the reported total assets of firm i in the annual report released prior to the bank loan announcement measured in 
dollars. Long Term Debt is the reported long term debts of firm i in the annual report released prior to the bank loan announcement measured in dollars. Short Term Debt is 
the reported short term debts of firm i in the annual report released prior to the bank loan announcement measured in dollars. Total Equity is the reported total equity of firm i 
in the annual report released prior to the bank loan announcement measured in dollars. Net Profit After Tax is the reported net profit after tax of firm i in the annual report 
released prior to the bank loan announcement measured in dollars. AvgTurnover is the average turnover of firm i in the period -100 to -15 days before a loan announcement. 
AvgSpread is the average bid-ask spread of firm i in the period -100 to -15 days before a loan announcement. Age is measured in days, and is calculated as the number of days 
between a firms listing date and loan announcement. NumAnalyst is the number of analysts following firm i on the day it made a loan announcement. Loss is a binary variable 
equal to one if the firm had a net profit after tax of less than zero. Analyst is a binary variable equal to one if the firm had an analyst covering them on the date of their bank 





Table 3 Loan descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Initial loan sample loan descriptive statistics 
Continuous variables Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max Count Disclosed % Disclosed 
Amount 76,384,201.42 31,000,000.00 163,693,587.21 1,000,000.00 1,200,000,000.00 211 97% 
Maturity 53.57 48.00 37.48 2.00 156.00 100 46% 
Number of lenders 1.42 1.00 0.87 1.00 6.00 212 98% 
 
Binary Variable Yes % Yes  
Interest rate 41 18.89%  
Hedging 56 25.81%  
BankEquity 61 28.11%  
EquityRaising 23 10.60%  
Panel B: Subsequent loan sample descriptive statistics 
Continuous variables Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max Count Disclosed % Disclosed 
Amount 159,140,351.07 58,750,000.00 389,775,642.92 1,000,000.00 4,500,000,000.00 188 99% 
Maturity 44.49 36.00 30.17 3.00 144.00 109 57% 
Number of lenders 1.78 1.00 1.18 1.00 7.00 181 95% 
 
Binary Variable Yes % Yes 
Interest rate 44 23.16% 
Hedging 35 18.42% 
BankEquity 43 22.63% 
EquityRaising 11 5.79% 
Table , Panel A provides descriptive statistics regarding the loans issued to the initial loan sample. Panel B provides descriptive statistics regarding the loans issued to the 
subsequent loan sample. Amount is represents the disclosed amount to be borrowed by the firm measured in dollars. Maturity represents the number of months until the loan 
must be paid back in full. Number of lenders represents the number of lenders that are disclosed to be providing the loan. Interest Rate is a binary variable equal to one if the 
interest rate payable on the loan is disclosed in the bank loan announcement. Hedging is a binary variable equal to one if the bank loan announcement discloses that the 
borrowing firm is required to undertake commodity or foreign exchange hedging. BankEquity is a binary variable equal to one if the bank loan announcement discloses that 
the lending firm has a stock or option position in the borrowing firm. EquityRaising is a binary variable equal to one if the bank loan announcement discloses that the 
borrowing firm is required to undertake an equity issuance.  
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Table 4 Lender frequency 
Bank Number of loans Aggregate Value of Loans 
Macquarie Bank 70  $                3,198,550,001.00  
ANZ Bank 33  $                3,694,519,047.62  
Commonwealth Bank of Australia 30  $                1,089,325,000.00  
Standard Bank 28  $                1,151,133,333.33  
Investec 27  $                1,253,952,380.95  
Rand Merchant Bank 27  $                   509,350,000.00  
Bank of Scotland 25  $                   848,666,666.67  
Societe Generale 24  $                   697,366,666.67  
Credit Suisse 21  $                3,196,000,000.00  
BNP Paribas 21  $                1,456,400,000.00  
Barclays Bank 20  $                   590,785,714.29  
Standard Chartered Bank 18  $                1,101,766,666.67  
China Development Bank 13  $                3,468,000,000.00  
Westpac 13  $                   283,091,666.67  
Deutsche Bank 12  $                   479,000,000.00  
National Australia Bank 12  $                   398,000,000.00  
Rothschild Australia 12  $                      79,666,666.67  
Nedbank 11  $                   112,000,000.00  
WestLB 10  $                   236,000,000.00  
ABN Amro 8  $                   204,000,000.00  
European Investment Bank 7  $                   320,700,000.00  
Bank West 7  $                   130,416,666.67  
Caterpillar Financial Services 7  $                      76,000,000.00  
Bank of China 5  $                   818,000,000.00  
Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation 5  $                   362,500,000.00  
International Finance Corp 5  $                   282,500,000.00  
HSBC 5  $                   121,333,333.33  
Beyerische Hypo-und Vereinsbank 5  $                      34,000,000.00  
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 4  $                   305,000,000.00  
ABSA Bank South Africa 4  $                      75,616,500.00  
Resource Capital Funds 4  $                      20,000,000.00  
Dresdner Bank 3  $                   160,033,333.33  
EIG Global Energy Partners 3  $                1,000,000,000.00  
Goldman Sachs 3  $                   404,166,666.67  
Korea Exchange Bank Australia 3  $                   265,000,000.00  
Raiffeisen Zentrallbank Osterreich 3  $                   260,000,000.00  
Royal Bank of Scotland 3  $                   134,200,000.00  
Sprott Resource Lending 3  $                      26,000,000.00  
Trafigura 3  $                   127,000,000.00  
Table  displays the top 40 banks sorted by the number of loans issued. Aggregate value of loans is calculated as 




Table 5 Daily average abnormal returns (AAR) surrounding bank loan announcements 
 Panel A: All loans Panel B: Initial Bank Loans (n=212) Panel C: Subsequent Loans (n=182) 
Event Day AAR t-stat AAR t-stat AAR t-stat 
-5 0.229% 1.035 0.421% 1.273 0.006% 0.021 
-4 0.000% -0.001 0.103% 0.298 -0.119% -0.395 
-3 -0.088% -0.444 0.073% 0.258 -0.276% -1.011 
-2 0.116% 0.599 0.233% 0.866 -0.019% -0.069 
-1 -0.108% -0.550 -0.208% -0.749 0.009% 0.034 
0 2.051% 7.273*** 2.480% 5.755*** 1.551% 4.495*** 
1 0.469% 1.489 0.481% 1.019 0.456% 1.123 
2 0.041% 0.174 -0.055% -0.174 0.153% 0.423 
3 0.306% 1.359 0.154% 0.431 0.482% 1.876* 
4 -0.349% -1.641 -0.615% -2.348** -0.041% -0.119 
5 -0.150% -0.691 -0.337% -1.042 0.067% 0.240 
Panel A presents the daily average abnormal returns (AAR) surrounding the total sample of bank loan announcements. Panel B presents the AAR surrounding initial bank 
loan announcements. Panel C presents the AAR surrounding subsequent bank loan announcements. AAR is calculated as outlined in equation (1). Student t-statistics are 
presented to show if the AAR is significantly different from zero. N is the number of observations.    Event Day ‘0’ represents the day of the bank loan announcement. Two 
tailed tests of significance are reported as follows *** less than 0.01 ** less than 0.05 and * less than 0.10.
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Table 6 Cumulative average abnormal returns surrounding bank loan 
announcements. 
Panel A: Cumulative average abnormal returns surrounding the total sample of bank loan 
announcements. 
Event Day CAAR t-stat N Count Positive % Positive CAAR 
-5 to 5 2.518% 3.552*** 396 222 56.06% 
-3 to 3 2.787% 4.657*** 396 226 57.07% 
-1 to 1 2.412% 5.840*** 396 244 61.61% 
0 to 1 2.520% 6.285*** 396 259 65.40% 
-5 to -2 0.257% 0.658 396 188 47.47% 
2 to 5 -0.151% -0.371 396 188 47.47% 
Panel B: Cumulative average abnormal returns surrounding initial bank loan announcements. 
Event Day CAAR t-stat N Count Positive % Positive AR 
-5 to 5 2.732% 2.728*** 213 120 56.33% 
-3 to 3 3.158% 3.587*** 213 122 57.27% 
-1 to 1 2.753% 4.696*** 213 131 61.50% 
0 to 1 2.961% 5.131*** 213 143 67.13% 
-5 to -2 0.828% 1.448 213 105 49.29% 
2 to 5 -0.849% -1.494 213 87 40.84% 
Panel C: Cumulative average abnormal returns surrounding subsequent loan announcements. 
Event Day CAAR t-stat N Count Positive % Positive AR 
-5 to 5 2.268% 2.269** 183 102 55.73% 
-3 to 3 2.355% 2.969*** 183 104 56.83% 
-1 to 1 2.015% 3.488*** 183 113 61.74% 
0 to 1 2.006% 3.659*** 183 116 63.38% 
-5 to -2 -0.409% -0.792 183 83 45.35% 
2 to 5 0.661% 1.147 183 101 55.19% 
Table  Panel A presents the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) surrounding the total sample of bank 
loan announcements. Panel B presents the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) surrounding the initial 
bank loan sample of announcements. Panel C presents the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) 
surrounding the subsequent bank loan sample of announcements. CAAR is calculated as outlined in equation 
(2). Student t-statistics are presented to show if the CAAR is significantly different from zero. N is the number 
of observations.  Count Positive is the number of announcements with a positive AAR. % Positive CAAR is 
calculated as Count Positive divided by N, to represent the % of firms with a positive cumulative abnormal 
reaction on the event day.  Event Day ‘0’ represents the day of the bank loan announcement. Two tailed tests of 




Table 7 Determinants of market reaction around bank loan announcements 
 Predicted 
 Sign 
Panel A: 0 to +1 Panel B: -5 to 5 Panel C: -10 to 10 
  Coeff t-stat p-value Coeff t-stat p-value Coeff t-stat p-value 
(Constant)  .003 .042 .967 .019 .153 .879 -.033 -.184 .854 
Initial + .005 .588 .557 -.012 -.829 .408 -.011 -.517 .606 
FirstAnn + .028 3.200*** .001 .026 1.670* .096 .045 2.064** .040 
LnAmount + .018 4.338*** .000 .018 2.447** .015 .011 1.099 .272 
Lenders - -.001 -.319 .750 .011 1.433 .153 .002 .199 .842 
Hedge ? -.015 -1.578 .115 -.006 -.340 .734 -.022 -.899 .369 
BankEquity + .016 1.637* .100 .024 1.368 .172 .041 1.637* .100 
EquityRaise - -.007 -.510 .610 .061 2.444** .015 .063 1.759* .079 
LnMCAP - .001 .314 .754 -.001 -.153 .879 .000 .047 .963 
Loss + .001 .148 .882 .022 1.313 .190 .028 1.211 .227 
NumAnalyst - -.001 -.383 .702 -.005 -2.026** .043 -.009 -2.303** .022 
F-stat  4.203  0.000*** 3.198  0.001*** 2.544  0.006*** 
Adjusted R2  .079   .056   .040   
N  374   374.000   374   
Table  presents Ordinary Least Squares regressions on the determinants of the cumulative average abnormal return around the release of a bank loan announcement. Panel A 
reports results over the event windows 0 to 1, Panel B reports results over the event window -5 to 5 and Panel C reports results over the event window -10 to 10.  
Regression variables are defined as: Initial represents a binary variable capturing if the loan is an initial loan. FirstAnn is a binary variable equal to one if the announcement is 
the first in a sequence of announcements. LnAmount is calculated as the dollar amount of borrowed funds scaled by the borrowing firm’s total assets in the period prior to the 
loan announcement. Lenders is the number of lenders mentioned in the bank loan announcement. Hedge is a binary variable equal to 1 if it is disclosed within the bank loan 
announcement that the bank requires the borrowing to hedge its commodity or foreign exchange exposure before a loan agreement can be completed. BankEquity is a binary 
variable equal to 1 if it is disclosed within the bank loan announcement that the bank owns shares, warrants or options of the borrowing firm. EquityRaise is a binary variable 
equal to 1 if it is disclosed within the bank loan announcement that the bank requires the borrowing firm to raise further equity before a loan agreement can be completed. 
LnMCap is the natural logarithm of the firm’s market capitalisation 15 days before the bank loan announcement. Loss is a binary variable equal to 1 if the firm reported a net 
profit after tax of less than zero in the annual report prior to the bank loan announcement. NumAnalyst is the number of analysts following  firm i on the announcement date. 
p-values are provided based on two-tailed tests of significance.
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Table 8 Average abnormal turnover surrounding bank loan announcements. 
 Total sample (n=362) Initial sample  
(n= 193) 
 
Subsequent sample (n=169) 
Event Day AATO t-stat AATO t-stat AATO t-stat 
-10 0.007% 0.372 0.020% 0.794 -0.008% -0.310 
-9 0.005% 0.230 0.011% 0.348 -0.002% -0.101 
-8 0.039% 1.066 0.011% 0.382 0.073% 0.997 
-7 0.016% 0.685 0.034% 1.003 -0.005% -0.142 
-6 -0.024% -1.970** -0.015% -0.902 -0.034% -1.932* 
-5 -0.012% -0.674 0.015% 0.516 -0.044% -2.594** 
-4 0.017% 0.630 0.024% 0.571 0.008% 0.274 
-3 0.011% 0.458 0.034% 0.820 -0.014% -0.569 
-2 0.022% 0.934 0.047% 1.251 -0.007% -0.241 
-1 -0.001% -0.030 -0.004% -0.175 0.004% 0.159 
0 0.123% 4.735*** 0.142% 3.621*** 0.102% 3.069*** 
1 0.080% 3.261*** 0.129% 3.128*** 0.024% 1.049 
2 0.060% 1.955* 0.069% 1.706* 0.050% 1.054 
3 0.011% 0.511 0.055% 1.563 -0.039% -1.506 
4 0.012% 0.473 0.045% 1.047 -0.026% -1.120 
5 -0.021% -1.187 -0.020% -1.063 -0.021% -0.690 
6 -0.022% -1.457 -0.023% -1.362 -0.021% -0.793 
7 -0.003% -0.149 0.011% 0.393 -0.019% -0.669 
8 -0.002% -0.126 -0.001% -0.027 -0.005% -0.134 
9 0.019% 0.878 0.035% 1.105 0.001% 0.033 
10 -0.004% -0.166 0.024% 0.530 -0.038% -1.476 
-10 to -1 0.077% 0.633 0.171% 0.932 -0.031 -0.201 
0 to 10 0.256% 1.718* 0.314% 2.149** 0.001% 0.044 
Table  presents the daily average abnormal turnover (AATO) surrounding the total sample of bank loan 
announcements, the initial sample of bank loan announcements and the subsequent sample of bank loan 
announcements.  AATO is calculated as outlined in equation (11). Cumulative average abnormal turnover is 
presented for the -10 to -1 and 0 to 10 day event window and calculated as the sum of the AATO of each day 
during the event window outlined in equation (12). Student t-statistics are presented to show if the AATO is 
significantly different from zero. Event Day ‘0’ represents the day of the bank loan announcement. Two tailed 




Table 9 Average abnormal spread surrounding bank loan announcements. 
 Total sample (n = 362) Initial sample (n = 193) Subsequent sample (n=169) 
Event Day AASPREAD t-stat AASPREAD t-stat AASPREAD t-stat 
-10 -0.312% -1.624 -0.716% -2.313** 0.149% 0.719 
-9 0.205% 0.716 0.440% 0.862 -0.063% -0.325 
-8 -0.053% -0.219 -0.141% -0.347 0.047% 0.200 
-7 0.195% 0.808 0.276% 0.674 0.102% 0.461 
-6 0.100% 0.408 0.277% 0.737 -0.103% -0.343 
-5 -0.011% -0.049 0.032% 0.085 -0.060% -0.307 
-4 -0.124% -0.453 -0.219% -0.449 -0.016% -0.085 
-3 0.223% 0.736 0.312% 0.589 0.121% 0.509 
-2 0.126% 0.504 0.230% 0.556 0.007% 0.027 
-1 0.010% 0.040 0.188% 0.465 -0.194% -0.864 
0 -0.136% -0.613 -0.146% -0.381 -0.124% -0.686 
1 -0.524% -2.495** -0.546% -1.652* -0.499% -2.030** 
2 -0.244% -1.123 -0.240% -0.650 -0.249% -1.245 
3 -0.188% -0.720 0.101% 0.227 -0.518% -2.298** 
4 -0.205% -0.696 -0.206% -0.422 -0.205% -0.683 
5 0.027% 0.101 0.236% 0.516 -0.212% -0.887 
6 -0.572% -2.137** -0.377% -1.178 -0.795% -1.797* 
7 -0.605% -2.403** -0.360% -1.205 -0.884% -2.118** 
8 -0.460% -1.938* -0.170% -0.481 -0.793% -2.552** 
9 -0.182% -0.791 -0.150% -0.374 -0.220% -1.155 
10 -0.211% -0.877 -0.204% -0.480 -0.219% -1.244 
-10 to -1 0.358% 0.197 0.679% 0.210 -0.010% -0.008 
1 to 10 -3.165% -1.915* -1.914% -0.693 -4.593% -2.854*** 
Table  presents the average abnormal spread surrounding the total sample of bank loan announcements, the 
initial sample of bank loan announcements, and the sample of subsequent loan announcements. Abnormal 
spread is calculated as outlined in equation (7). Cumulative average abnormal spread is presented for the event 
window -10 to -1 and 1 to 10 and calculated as outlined in equation (8). Student t-statistics are presented to 
show if the AASPREAD is significantly different from zero. Event Day ‘0’ represents the day of the bank loan 




Table 10 Determinants of abnormal turnover and abnormal spread 
 Panel A: Abnormal Turnover -10 to 10  Panel B: Abnormal Spread -10 to 10  
 Coeff t-stat p-value Coeff t-stat p-value 
(Constant) -.007 -.283 .777 -.545 -2.305** .022 
Initial .002 .710 .478 .019 .700 .485 
FirstAnn .008 2.644*** .009 -.045 -1.559 .120 
LnAmount .002 1.163 .246 -.010 -.713 .476 
Lenders .001 .902 .368 -.031 -2.168** .031 
Hedge .000 .137 .891 .005 .164 .870 
BankEquity -.008 -2.313** .021 .016 .489 .625 
EquityRaise .013 2.809*** .005 .034 .766 .444 
LnMCAP 0.00 .043 .966 .033 2.567** .011 
Loss .004 1.286 .199 -.056 -1.835* .067 
NumAnalyst .000 -.764 .445 -.002 -.440 .660 
F-stat 2.804  0.002*** 2.517  .006*** 
Adjusted R2 .046   .042   
N 370   345   
Table  Panel A presents an Ordinary Least Squares regression on the determinants of the cumulative average abnormal turnover over the -10 to 10 day event window. Panel B 
presents an Ordinary Least Squares regression on the determinants of the cumulative average abnormal spread over the -10 to 10 day event window. Regression variables are 
defined as: Initial represents a binary variable capturing if the loan is an initial loan. FirstAnn is a binary variable equal to one if the announcement is the first in a sequence of 
announcements. LnAmount is calculated as the dollar amount of borrowed funds scaled by the borrowing firm’s total assets in the period prior to the loan announcement. 
Lenders is the number of lenders mentioned in the bank loan announcement. Hedge is a binary variable equal to 1 if it is disclosed within the bank loan announcement that 
the bank requires the borrowing to hedge its commodity or foreign exchange exposure before a loan agreement can be completed. BankEquity is a binary variable equal to 1 if 
it is disclosed within the bank loan announcement that the bank owns shares, warrants or options of the borrowing firm. EquityRaise is a binary variable equal to 1 if it is 
disclosed within the bank loan announcement that the bank requires the borrowing firm to raise further equity before a loan agreement can be completed. LnMCap is the 
natural logarithm of the firm’s market capitalisation 15 days before the bank loan announcement. Loss is a binary variable equal to 1 if the firm reported a net profit after tax 
of less than zero in the annual report prior to the bank loan announcement. NumAnalyst is the number of analysts following  firm i on the announcement date. p-values are 
provided based on two-tailed tests of significance 
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Table 11 Cumulative average abnormal returns for loans issued by an industry 
specialist or non-specialist 
 Macquarie Bank 
(n=69) 
Non Macquarie Bank 
 (n=327) 
Difference   
Event Day CAAR t-stat CAAR t-stat Mean difference t-stat p-value 
-5 to 5 5.053% 3.063*** 1.89% 2.167** 3.167% 1.745** 0.042 
-3 to 3 4.125% 2.884*** 2.45% 3.599*** 1.677% 1.071 0.143 
-1 to 1 2.564% 2.518** 2.32% 5.336*** 0.242% .219 0.414 
Table  presents the cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) surrounding loans issued by Macquarie Bank, 
and loans issued by non-industry specialist lenders. t-statistics test if the CAAR is significantly different from 
zero. The mean difference shows the difference between the two sample CAARs. t-statistics are provided to test 




Table 12 Determinants of market reaction around bank loan announcements testing for industry specialisation 
 Predicted Panel A: 0 to +1   Panel B: -5 to +5  Panel C: -10 to +10  
  Coeff t-stat p-value Coeff t-stat p-value Coeff t-stat p-value 
(Constant)  .002 .029 .977 .024 .190 .849 -.022 -.122 .903 
Macquarie + -.006 -.539 .590 .032 1.636* 0.100* .078 2.804*** .005 
Initial + .005 .600 .549 -.013 -.868 .386 -.012 -.587 .558 
FirstAnn + .028 3.175*** .002 .027 1.732* .084 .048 2.186** .029 
LnAmount + .018 4.363*** .000 .017 2.313** .021 .009 .879 .380 
Lenders - -.001 -.343 .732 .011 1.508 .132 .003 .329 .742 
Hedge ? -.014 -1.400 .162 -.013 -.722 .471 -.038 -1.557 .120 
BankEquity + .018 1.697* .091 .016 .895 .371 .022 .854 .393 
EquityRaise - -.007 -.517 .606 .061 2.470** .014 .064 1.811* .071 
LnMCAP - .001 .342 .732 -.002 -.240 .810 -.001 -.104 .917 
Loss + .001 .083 .934 .025 1.498 .135 .036 1.544 .123 
NumAnalyst - -.001 -.372 .710 -.006 -2.064** .040 -.009 -2.382** .018 
F-stat  3.840  0.000*** 3.160  .000*** 3.072  .001
***
 
Adjusted R2  .077   .060   .057   
N  374   374   374   
Table 1 presents Ordinary Least Squares regressions on the determinants of the cumulative average abnormal return around the release of a bank loan announcement. Panel A 
reports results over the event windows 0 to 1, Panel B reports results over the event window -5 to 5 and Panel C reports results over the event window -10 to 10.  
Regression variables are defined as: Macquarie represents a binary variable equal to one if the loan is issued by industry leader Macquarie Bank Initial represents a binary 
variable capturing if the loan is an initial loan. FirstAnn is a binary variable equal to one if the announcement is the first in a sequence of announcements. LnAmount is 
calculated as the dollar amount of borrowed funds scaled by the borrowing firm’s total assets in the period prior to the loan announcement. Lenders is the number of lenders 
mentioned in the bank loan announcement. Hedge is a binary variable equal to 1 if it is disclosed within the bank loan announcement that the bank requires the borrowing to 
hedge its commodity or foreign exchange exposure before a loan agreement can be completed. BankEquity is a binary variable equal to 1 if it is disclosed within the bank 
loan announcement that the bank owns shares, warrants or options of the borrowing firm. EquityRaise is a binary variable equal to 1 if it is disclosed within the bank loan 
announcement that the bank requires the borrowing firm to raise further equity before a loan agreement can be completed. LnMCap is the natural logarithm of the firm’s 
market capitalisation 15 days before the bank loan announcement. Loss is a binary variable equal to 1 if the firm reported a net profit after tax of less than zero in the annual 




Figure 1 Daily average abnormal returns (AAR) over the -10 to 10 day event 
window. 
Panel A: Daily average abnormal returns over the -10 to 10 day event window for the total 
sample of bank loan announcements.
 
Panel B: Daily average abnormal returns over the -10 to 10 day event window for the initial 
bank loan sample of announcements.
Panel C: Daily average abnormal returns over the -10 to 10 day event window for the 
subsequent bank loan sample of announcements.
Figure 1, Panel A shows the average abnormal return for each event day in the -10 to 10 day event window, 
using the full sample of bank loan announcements. Panel B shows the average abnormal return for each event 
day in the -10 to 10 day event window, surrounding the sample of initial bank loan announcements. Panel C 
shows the average abnormal return for each event day in the -10 to 10 day event window, surrounding the 























































































Figure 2 Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) over the -5 to 5 day 
event window. 
Panel A: Cumulative average abnormal returns over the -5 to 5 day event window for the 
total sample of bank loan announcements. 
 
Panel B: Cumulative average abnormal returns over the -5 to 5 day event window for the 
initial bank loan sample of announcements.
 
Panel C: Cumulative average abnormal returns over the -5 to 5 day event window for the 
subsequent bank loan sample of announcements.
 
Figure 2 Panel A shows the cumulative average abnormal return over the -5 to 5 day event window, using the 
full sample of bank loan announcements. Panel B shows the cumulative average abnormal return over the -5 to 5 
day event window, using the sample of initial bank loan announcements. Panel C shows the cumulative average 
abnormal return over the -5 to 5 day event window, using the sample of subsequent bank loan announcements. 















































































































Figure 3 Average abnormal turnover (AATO) over the -10 to 10 event window 
Panel A: Average abnormal turnover over the -10 to 10 event window surrounding the total 
sample of bank loan announcements. 
 
Panel B: Average abnormal turnover over the -10 to 10 event window surrounding the sample 
of initial bank loan announcements. 
 
Panel C: Average abnormal turnover over the -10 to 10 event window surrounding the sample 
of subsequent bank loan announcements. 
 
Figure 3 Panel A shows the cumulative average abnormal return over the -5 to 5 day event window; using the 
full sample of bank loan announcements. Panel B shows the cumulative average abnormal return over the -5 to 5 
day event window, using the sample of initial bank loan announcements. Panel C shows the cumulative average 
abnormal return over the -5 to 5 day event window, using the sample of subsequent bank loan announcements. 











































































Figure 4 Average abnormal spread over the -10 to 10 event window. 
Panel A: Average abnormal spread over the -10 to 10 event window surrounding the total 
sample of bank loan announcements. 
 
Panel B: Average abnormal spread over the -10 to 10 event window surrounding the initial 
bank loan sample of announcements. 
 
Panel C: Average abnormal spread over the -10 to 10 event window surrounding the sample 
of subsequent bank loan announcements. 
 
Figure 4 Panel A presents the average abnormal spread surrounding the total sample of bank loan 
announcements. Panel B presents the average abnormal spread surrounding the sample of initial bank loan 
announcements. Panel C presents average abnormal spread surrounding the sample of subsequent bank loan 
announcements. Abnormal spread is calculated as in equation (6). Event day ‘0’ represents the date of the bank 
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